Valuation of Securities of Closely-Held Corporations by Butala, John H., Jr.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 2
1963
Valuation of Securities of Closely-Held
Corporations
John H. Butala Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
John H. Butala Jr., Valuation of Securities of Closely-Held Corporations, 14 W. Res. L. Rev. 193 (1963)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol14/iss2/9
SECURITIES OF CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS
earning power, and its current competitive position in its product field.
In most situations, one will find that this valuation factor will range from
five times current earnings to fifteen times current earnings. Generally
one will find that no possible speculative force exists, as might exist in
the stock market, to warrant a capitalization of current earnings at factors
of twenty to thirty times current earnings. One will also generally find
that, except in the most unusual circumstances, no logical economic ex-
planations exist to justify a capitalization of current earnings at less than
five times.
CONCLUSION
The determination of a value of closely-held stock which will be
realistic to the taxpayer and convincing to the Treasury Department and
the courts will evidence particular elements which must include the fol-
lowing: (1) a sound economic judgment based upon the particular facts
of the closely-held corporation being valued, with special emphasis on the
current earnings; (2) a value based upon comparison of the costs of
similar investments, not necessarily a comparison of the stock market
value of securities in a related industry; and (3) a value that evidences
sound economic judgment, showing particularly that the valuation is of
a business that requires a value determined by opinion and therefore can-
not be established by a formula found or developed from the trading price
of stock in the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange,
and the over-the-counter markets for securities. Experience has shown
that a value of closely-held stock so determined will be fair, reasonable,
and realistic.
IV
VALUATION OF SECURITIES OF CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS
John H. Butala, Jr.
A broad discussion of the various factors involved in the valuation of
closely-held stock is contained in the previous article.' The present
article will focus the discussion on three specific and troublesome aspects
of the problem. These are: (1) the valuation approach with respect to
stock of a closely-held asset-holding company; (2) the effect of voting
1. Conway, Valuation of Stock in a Close Corporation for Estate Tax and Gift Tax Purposes,
supra at 188.
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control in the valuation concept; and (3) the amount of discount, if any,
which should be allowed to reflect lack of marketability.
VALUATION OF ASSET-HOLDING COMPANY STOCK
In the context of this discussion, the term "asset-holding company"
designates a company whose only function is to hold title to investment
type assets. It is to be contrasted with an "operating company" whose
primary function is the manufacture or sale of products or services.
In what manner should the stock of an asset-holding company be
valued? Should the valuation be determined by the traditional method
in which primary emphasis is given to the capitalization of earnings, or
is a more accurate valuation obtained by basing the fair market value on
the value of the underlying assets of the company? If the value of the
underlying assets is considered to be controlling, should any discount be
allowed from such net asset value?2 The courts have not adopted a con-
sistent approach. As might be expected, however, the Internal Revenue
Service has. Its attitude is expressed in Revenue Ruling 59-60' in an
expertly worded statement which lucidly, although argumentatively, sets
forth the Service's opinion as to the proper approach, while avoiding a
head-on contradiction of statements contained in numerous court deci-
sions. The value of stock of an asset-holding company, one is told, is
"closely related to the value of the assets underlying the stock," and "ad-
justed net worth"4 should be given greater weight than any other factor.
An unmistakable inference is to be drawn, although the language stops
just short of saying so, that there is no need to capitalize the earnings of
the company because this has already been done in arriving at the fair
market value of the underlying assets. The ruling states that one may
consider two adjustments to the net asset value: the operating expenses
2. The term "net asset value" represents the fair market value of the underlying assets of the
company less its liabilities and preferred stock. The term differs from "book value" in that
the latter is computed by taking assets at their cost prices on the company's books rather than
at their fair market values.
3. 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 237: "The value of the stock of a closely held investment or real estate
holding company, whether or not family owned, is closely related to the value of the assets
underlying the stock. For companies of this type the appraiser should determine the fair
market values of the assets of the company. Operating expenses of such a company and the
cost of liquidating it, if any, merit consideration when appraising the relative values of the
stock and the underlying assets. The market values of the underlying assets give due weight
to potential earnings and dividends of the particular items of property underlying the stock,
capitalized at rates deemed proper by the investing public at the date of appraisal. A current
appraisal by the investing public should be superior to the retrospective opinion of an indi-
vidual. For these reasons, adjusted net worth should be accorded greater weight in valuing
the stock of a closely held investment or real estate holding company, whether or not family
owned, than any of the other customary yardsticks of appraisal, such as earnings and dividend
paying capacity."
4. "Adjusted net worth," as used in the ruling, is the same as net asset value. For a defini-
tion of "net asset value," see note 2 supra.
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of the company5 and the costs of liquidating the company. There is, how-
ever, no indication whatsoever that any percentage discount from net as-
set value should be allowed to reflect the indirect ownership of the assets.
Curiously, in two recent court cases, both decided after publication of
Revenue Ruling 59-60,6 the Service produced expert witnesses who testi-
fied that a percentage discount was appropriate. In Paulina DuPont
Dean7 the Service's expert witness testified that a discount of twenty-five
per cent should be allowed, and the Service conceded the propriety of a
discount. In Drybrough v. United States' the parties appear to have
agreed to a valuation approach consisting of the determination of under-
lying net asset value and the subtraction of a discount from such value.
The Service's witness testified that a twenty per cent discount was proper.
Despite the Commissioner's argument on brief that no discount should
be allowed (which surely must have been half-hearted), the court de-
termined that a thirty-five per cent discount should be allowed. It is per-
haps more of a hope than a logical inference to conclude that these two
cases signal a softening of the Service's attitude in the future.
What may the litigant expect if he decides to press the valuation
issue beyond the administrative level? Despite the fortunate experiences
encountered by the taxpayer in the Dean9 and Drybrough'0 cases, the
litigant may expect the Service to maintain its insistence that net asset
value without discount controls fair market value, although it will profess
to have considered all factors. However, the courts will probably not
adopt this approach. On the following pages1' is a tabulation of all of
the asset-holding company valuation cases which the author could find.
In each case, the fair market value ultimately found by the court has been
expressed in terms of a discount from underlying net asset value. The
tabulation should not be taken as suggesting that all of the cases pro-
ceeded in this manner, i.e., to determine net asset value and then to allow
a discount from that value. On the contrary, a variety of approaches was
involved, and, as a matter of fact, the aggregation of cases may be cited
for the proposition that in most instances net asset value will not be con-
sidered controlling. The most consistent approach has been a general
one, i.e., a generalized discussion of earnings, dividends, and net worth,
much the same as though the valuation of stock of an operating company
were involved. This approach appears to have been molded by a desire
5. It is clear from the context of the statement that such operating expenses do not include
the corporate income tax.
6. 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 237.
7. 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 314 (1960).
8. 208 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
9. 29 P.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 314 (1960).
10. 208 . Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
11. At 196-99 infra.
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to minimize risk of reversal upon appeal. From this viewpoint, the safest
course is to be general rather than specific, to discuss all factors as though
touching all bases, and, above all, not to even suggest that any one factor
may be controlling. The results of the cases clearly indicate, however,
that a taxpayer may reasonably anticipate a valuation substantially below
net asset value."2
Four cases did not allow any discount from underlying net asset
value."8 But these cases can hardly be regarded as reliable precedent for
the Service's approach. In Estate of Joseph E. Goar4 the taxpayer did
not claim any discount. His entire argument concerned the proper de-
termination of net asset value.'5 In Estate of Frank A. Cruikshank8 the
net asset value approach was adopted by both parties and that value was
stipulated. The taxpayer argued that a discount should be allowed to
reflect commissions and capital gains taxes which would be incurred by
the company upon a sale of all of its assets and a distribution to the share-
holders. Faced with this specific argument, the court properly rejected it.
No liquidation was contemplated. Further, even if liquidation were as-
sumed, distribution could be made in kind, and both commissions and
corporate capital gains thereby eliminated.'
In Richardson v. Commissioner"8 the language of the lower court's
opinion 9 clearly indicated sympathy with the Service's position. It up-
held the Service's determination of value which coincided with net asset
value carried out to three decimal places. However, the lower court pru-
dently expressed the magic words that its decision had been based upon
a consideration of all factors and was not based upon net asset value alone.
The appellate court, notwithstanding a forceful dissent, affirmed, stating
that a valuation based solely on net asset value was subject to reversal but
declining to reverse in the face of the statement that all factors had been
considered.2" Since the final value was identical to fiet asset value ex-
12. It is recognized, of course, that a taxpayer may desire to obtain a high value rather than
a low one, as, for example, where fair market value on a given date may establish the income
tax cost basis of a security. In the great majority of cases, however, usually for estate and gift
tax purposes, a low value is the objective.
13. Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1945); Bank of Cal. v. Commis-
sioner, 133 F.2d 428 (9th Cit. 1943); Estate of Joseph E. Goat, 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 794
(1950); Estate of Frank A. Cruikshank, 9 T.C. 162 (1947).
14. 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 794 (1950).
15. The most valuable asset held by the company was the stock of another closely-held com-
pany. Ibid.
16. 9 T.C. 162 (1947).
17. However, if the shareholders are numerous or the assets are non-liquid in nature, sale
of the underlying assets may be a practical necessity in order to effect distribution. The pres-
ent § 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 eliminates the corporate capital gain tax if
a plan of liquidation is adopted and liquidation is completed within one year thereafter.
18. 151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1945).
19. H. Smith Richardson, 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1577 (1943).
20. Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cit. 1945).
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pressed through three decimal places, the decision should probably be re-
garded as an example of compulsive politeness or enormous gullibility.
It may also be cited for the proposition that words sometimes speak louder
than action. Bank of Cal. v. Commissioner21 is similar. The "consider-
ation" was of all factors but the result was a net asset value determination.
On occasion a court has approached the problem upon a liquidating
value basis. m Where liquidation is in process or contemplated, this ap-
proach assumes considerable importance, for a deduction will be allowed
for costs of liquidation' Where liquidation is not contemplated, the
courts will generally not consider this factor as influential. This is par-
ticularly true where a minority interest is involved and liquidation cannot
be forced2
Another line of cases has approached the problem by comparing the
closely-held stock of an asset-holding company to the shares of dosed-end
investment trusts.2" A dosed-end investment trust is essentially a publicly-
held and listed asset-holding company. This approach appears to be as
sensible as it is simple. The statute requires that there be taken into
consideration a comparison with companies engaged in the same or a
similar line of business.2" A closed-end trust, unless it deals in special
situations or provides extensive management services, appears to be en-
gaged in a "similar line of business," i.e., the holding of investment type
assets. A publidy-held trust is, of course, usually much larger than the
typical closely-held asset-holding company.27 If the investment trust is
diversified in nature and meets certain other requirements, it is free of
21. 133 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1943). The decision illustrates another variation of method in
arriving at a net asset value result. The court considered earnings and dividends but rejected
them as being abnormal and thus not indicative of the future. It therefore fell back upon
net asset value as the sole reliable criterion in evidence. The approach is not sound. Valua-
tion cannot be predicated upon one stable factor out of three as though the stock is thereby
rendered stable. Although earnings and dividends may be erratic, abnormal, or non-existent,
the investing public never ignores these factors but places a speculative value upon the stock.
If a security normally sells for less than its book value or net asset value, a succession of deficit
years surely will not cause the security to rise in price to book value or asset value.
22. Liquidating value would appear to be nothing more than net asset value less the costs of
liquidation.
23. See Forbes v. Hassett, 124 F.2d 925 (1st Cir. 1942); Weber v. Rasquin, 101 F.2d 62
(2d Cir. 1939).
24. See Bartram v. Graham, 157 F. Supp. 757 (D. Conn. 1957); Bishop Trust Co. v. United
States, 50-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 10764 (D. Hawaii 1950); Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F.
Supp. 866 (D. Conn. 1945); Estate of Charles W..Heppenstall, Sr., 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
115 (1949).
25. Goss v. Fitzpatrick, 97 F. Supp. 765 (D. Conn. 1951); Blackard v. Jones, 62 F. Supp.
234 (W.D. Okla. 1944); Fred Pabst, Sr., 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1016 (1947); Estate of
Harold H. Brittingham, 11 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 155 (1942).
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2031(b) [hereinafter cited as CODE $].
27. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 237, has eliminated the requirement contained in
prior Rev. Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 187, that comparability must include similarity
in size. The effect of the former requirement was to render the statutory requirement inap-
plicable in virtually every case.
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capital gains tax.2" Because of this advantage on the side of the publicly-
held comparative companies, a comparison with such trusts should sug-
gest the upper limits in the valuation of the stock of a closely-held asset-
holding company.
Reasons for Discount from Net Asset Value
Why should the stock of an asset-holding company sell at a discount
from underlying net asset value? Various reasons may be advanced:
(1) As the Internal Revenue Service concedes, 9 additional ex-
penses are incurred by the owner of such stock, such as the expense of
operating the corporation and the costs of liquidating the corporation,
should that course be elected.
(2) A corporate income tax, ranging in rates from fifty-two to
fifteen per cent,"0 is incurred. The earnings are thus reduced by corporate
taxes before transmission to the shareholders. This fact in itself appears
to be a refutation of the Service's argument thait there is no need to capi-
talize the corporate earnings since this has been done in the process of
valuing the underlying assets. The earnings of the underlying assets and
the earnings of the corporation are not the same because of the corporate
income tax.
(3) There is at least a risk that a corporate capital gains tax may
be incurred if liquidation is not properly handled.
(4) When a hypothetical buyer may buy the identical or similar
property directly, he will not buy into a closely-held family holding com-
pany except at a substantial discount.
(5) A minority shareholder cannot force a liquidation. He is at
the mercy of the controlling shareholders, who may manage the prop-
erties to suit their objectives rather than his.
(6) Closed-end publicly-held investment trusts usually sell at a
discount from underlying asset value. For the same reasons, whatever
they may be in the minds of the investing public, the stock of a closely-
held asset-holding company should sell at a similar discount
In the author's opinion, the stock of an asset-holding company should
be valued at an appreciable discount from net asset value. Any one or
more of the factors enumerated may be present in any given situation,
sometimes as an open matter of contention but more frequently latent.
All are reflections of the disadvantages of indirect ownership. These
disadvantages are properly expressed by an appropriate discount from
the value such assets would have if held directly.3 '
28. CoDE § 852.
29. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 237.
30. CODE §§ 11, 243 (relating to the usual tax on a corporation's dividend and other in-
come). There are also penalty taxes imposed in special situations.
31. A problem similar to that of valuing stock of an asset-holding company arises in the case
[Vol. 14:2
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EFFECT OF VOTING CONTROL IN THE VALUATION CONCEPT
Inasmuch as the courts have usually adopted a broad and generalized
(and non-appealable) approach to the valuation of closely-held stock,
it is not surprising that the proper emphasis to be given to voting control
has not been delineated by the courts. Voting control has been fre-
quently mentioned but almost never discussed.
Control perhaps may be usefully segregated into three types: (1) ma-
jority control - control of more than fifty per cent of the outstanding
stock; (2) liquidating control -the power to effect a dissolution of the
corporation irrespective of the desires of minority shareholders; 2 and
(3) effective control - a concept mentioned in Revenue Ruling 59-60"
which, it is assumed, is the ownership of sufficient stock, although less
than fifty per cent, to permit control of the policies of the corporation
because other shareholders are numerous, scattered, or passive in their
attitudes.
These refinements of definition are surplusage in any discussion of
the judicial attitude. Totally aside from the numerous cases which merely
contain a fleeting mention of the control factor, the actual cases which
have involved control situations are of little help in assessing the im-
portance of control. With one exception,' 4 the cases have not taken a
different approach because of the presence of voting control.3 5 Again,
the approach has been general. All factors are considered and rarely is
one factor singled out for emphasis. Vhittemore v. Fitzpatrick" is
illustrative. In that case, 600 shares out of a total of 820 shares out-
standing of an asset-holding company were involved in the valuation
issue. Yet the court's determination of fair market value represented a
discount from net asset value in excess of fifty per cent.
of valuing stock of an operating company which holds a large portfolio of securities in excess
of its business needs. It has been suggested that the proper valuation approach here is to
determine the value of the going business and then add to it the value of the securities.
In Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727 (D. Mass. 1961), the court refused to
adopt this approach where a minority shareholder was involved. Among the reasons cited
was the fact that such a shareholder could not have caused the securities to be distributed to
him and hence would not pay full value for them. See also Estate of Charles H. M. Atkins,
20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 917 (1951).
32. In Ohio, liquidating control is governed by OHio REV. CODE § 1701.86. Liquidation
requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the total shares, unless the articles of incorpora-
tion have established a different requirement.
33. 1959-1 CUm. BULL. 237.
34. Slimp v. United States, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 10949 (D. Tex. 1954).
35. See Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1945); Estate of James D.
McDermott, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 450 (1953); Estate of Bozo Banac, 17 T.C. 748 (1951);
Estate of Frank L. Gray, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 752 (1951); Estate of Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503
(1947); Estate of Charles E. Kimball, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 913 (1946); P. C. Pendleton, 20
B.T.A. 618 (1930); Estate of T. C. Thompson, 3 B.T.A. 902 (1925).
36. 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1945).
1963]
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The exception mentioned is Slim p v. United States.37 The case
qualifies as a curiosity as well as an exception. The decedent owned fifty
per cent of the stock of a company. His son owned the other fifty per cent.
On the same date the decedent made gifts of his shares, in part to his
son and the balance to other children and grandchildren. The court
determined, without discussion, that the fair market value of the shares
given to the son was $175 per share while the fair market value of the
shares given to the other family members was $150 per share. The
absence of discussion may be a blessing, for the result seems patently
incorrect. If control in the hands of the recipient is the determinative
factor, then only one of the shares given to the son should have been
valued at a premium.
Revenue Ruling 59-60"8 mentions the control concept in two in-
stances. In discussing the weight to be given to dividend paying capacity,
it points out that, where actual or effective control is involved, the
dividend factor is not a material element in the valuation approach since
the controlling group will presumably manipulate the dividend payment
to suit the shareholders' tax objectives and may distort the net income
of the company (which controls dividend paying capacity) by substitut-
ing salary and bonuses for dividends. " It also indicates that sales of
small amounts of stock cannot be taken as a measure of value where con-
trolling interests are involved, inasmuch as control represents "an added
element of value. 4
0
Internal Revenue Service personnel sometimes adopt what may be
termed an informal "family attribution" approach in determining con-
trol. This is illustrated in Estate of Charles W. Heppenstall, Sr. "' This
approach groups the entire family holdings to determine whether control
exists. Presumably this proceeds from the premise that all family mem-
bers will act in concert, that the company will be liquidated upon the
taxpayer's request, if that be desired, or that his stock will be accom-
modatingly redeemed at his wish. No court appears to have given any
recognition to such an approach. Nor is the argument persuasive from
a practical approach. Again, the disadvantages of indirect ownership
present obstacles to concerted action. Even a related or friendly share-
holder is not likely to agree to a liquidation if he is burdened (or blessed)
with a low income tax cost basis in contrast to an estate's newly acquired
high basis. Redemption may not be possible because of the financial
37. 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 10949 (D. Tex. 1954).
38. 1959-1 CuM. BuLL. 237.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. 18 P-H Tax Ct.M em. 115 (1949).
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condition of the corporation. Where finances are not an obstacle, the
income tax family attribution rules' may make the tax cost prohibitive.
Clearly, where majority control is involved, the stock has an added
element of value which should be recognized in the valuation approach.
Such control carries with it the right to direct the corporation's policies,
many of which, such as the payment of salaries and the determination of
dividend payments, can result in direct and increased monetary return.
Effective control should similarly command a premium in the valuation
of the stock, although there are hazards in determining its existence and
in assessing its permanence. In the usual case, the premium to be ac-
corded to a control block of stock should produce a valuation somewhat
above that indicated by a capitalization of earnings, but not extending
to the valuation which might be determined if liquidating control were
involved. Where liquidating control exists, estimated liquidating value
should reasonably establish a minimum value or "floor" in the deter-
mination of fair market value. One may credibly assume that closely-
held stock will not be sold for something less than would be realized
by liquidating the company.
DISCOUNT FOR LACK OF MARKETABILITY
Still another factor in the valuation concept has proved to be trouble-
some to assess and has been historically handled by the courts in the
vaguest of terms. This is the discount, from the value otherwise de-
termined, to reflect the lack of marketability of closely-held stock. The
basis for the discount is the common sense belief that a purchaser will pay
less for an asset which may prove difficult to resell than he will for an
asset which is easily traded. The courts have agreed that such a dis-
count is a proper factor to be considered," but they have seldom stated
the extent of the discount. The usual practice has been simply to state
that such a factor has been considered in arriving at the final determina-
tion of fair market value. A few cases have expressed the discount in
percentage terms4
In two recent cases,45 however, a more specific approach has been
42. CODE §§ 302, 318. These rules may convert the redemption into a dividend, and capital
gain or loss into ordinary income.
43. See Bank of Cal. v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1943); Baltimore Nat'l Bank
v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D. Md. 1955); Schnorbach v. Kavanagh, 102 F. Supp.
828 (W.D. Mich. 1951); Fred Pabst, Sr., 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1016 (1947).
44. Snyder v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. N.C. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 285
F.2d 857 (4th Cir. 1961) (ten per cent, which included factors other than lack of market-
ability) Bader v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ill. 1959) (fifteen per cent); First
Trust Co. v. United States, 59-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 11843 (W.D. Mo. 1958) (fifteen per cent);
Central Trust Co. v. United States, 305 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1962), (12.17 per cent).
45. First Trust Co. v. United States, 59-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 11843 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Central
Trust Co. v. United States, 305 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
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adopted. This approach may be stated as follows: If a discount is to be
allowed to reflect the lack of a market, then the measure of that discount
should be the cost of making such a market. The cost of making a
market is the cost of a public offering or "flotation cost." In First Trust
Co. v. United States4" the court, adopting this approach, permitted a
fifteen per cent discount for lack of marketability. This case was cited
with approval by Central Trust Co. v. United States," which, also
using flotation costs as the measure, considered a 12.17 per cent discount
for lack of marketability in arriving at its ultimate determination of
fair market value. The Securities and Exchange Commission periodically
publishes data with respect to flotation costs of public offerings, and this
data is generally introduced in evidence as the basis for such a discount.
The flotation costs are expressed as percentages of the offering prices
and range from 19.6 per cent for small offerings ($2.5 million) to 4.88
per cent for large offerings ($10 million or more)."
Previously in Campbell's Estate v. Kavanagh49 this approach had been
specifically rejected. In that case the parties stipulated that closely-held
stock could have been publicly offered at $175 per share but that $26
per share of flotation costs would have been incurred. The taxpayer
argued that the fair market value was therefore $149 per share. In a
scatter-shot opinion, somewhat hysterical in tone, the court rejected
the discount, characterizing it as "ridiculous," and appeared ready to
override the stipulations as well. Presented in the manner in which it
was, the claimed discount appeared to be equivalent to an estimated
broker's commission upon the sale of a listed stock, and this fact perhaps
influenced, or more likely, confused the court.
A more serious objection to the use of flotation costs as the measure
for the discount is the fact that such costs may not be a realistic measure
for small holdings of stock. Obviously, a very small company could
never market its stock; the cost of attempting to do so would be pro-
hibitive. As a compromise, this situation somewhat logically leads to the
application of the percentage discount, approximately twenty per cent,
incurred with respect to small public offerings to the great majority of
valuations for tax purposes.
Despite the possible objections mentioned, the approach has much
to commend it. It is a logical attempt at measurement and has welcome
substance in an area where vagueness and lip-service recognition long
prevailed. One may hope that the approach will gather further judicial
support.
46. 59-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 11843 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
47. 305 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
48. SEC, Cost of Flotation of Corporate Securities 1951-1955 at 40, June 1957.
49. 114 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
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